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FINANCING PUBLIC INTEREST
LITIGATION IN STATE COURT:
A PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION
Robert Hermannt and R. Thomas Hoffmann tt
INTRODUCTION

Public interest lawyers are advocates of causes that historically
have enjoyed limited legal representation. Their role rests on the
premise that the legal system serves the public interest best when it
provides able representation for all genuinely interested parties to
a controversy.' Justice Thurgood Marshall recently offered this
representative view of public interest lawyers:
Public interest lawyers today provide representation to a broad
range of relatively powerless minorities-for example, the mentally ill, children, and the poor of all races. They also represent
neglected but widely diffuse interests that most of us share as
t Legal Director, Puerto Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc.; B.A. 1966,
Dartmouth College; LL.B. 1969, Yale University.
tt Attorney, International Institute for Environment and Development, Washington,
D.C.; A.B. 1972, Georgetown University; B.A. 1975, Oxford University; J.D. 1976, New
York University.
I This concept permeates the literature on public interest representation. See, e.g.,
Awarding of Attorneys' Fees: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration ofJustice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 118 (Comm.
Print 1975) (statement of Charles R. Halpern, Council for Public Interest Law) [hereinafter
cited as House Subcommittee Hearings]; Final Report of the American Assembly on Law and a
Changing Society I, 61 A.B.A.J. 931, 932-33 (1975); Comment, The New Public Interest
Laugyers, 79 YALE L.J. 1069, 1071 n.3 (1970). However, attempts to define "public interest"
have provoked disagreement. For some heterodox views on public interest practice, see
Cahn & Cahn, Power To the People or the Profession?-The Public Interest in Public Interest Law,
79 YALE L.J. 1005 (1970); Hegland, Beyond Enthusiasm and Commitment, 13 ARIZ. L. REv.
805 (1971).
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consumers and as individuals in need of privacy and a healthy
environment.
[T]he decision maker should have the opportunity to
[..
assess the impact of any given administrative, legislative, or judicial decision in terms of all the people it will affect. This cannot be accomplished without a public interest presence whose
function is to advocate, in the true sense, the needs and desires
of the underrepresented and unrepresented segments of so2
ciety.
The justification for public interest lawyers is not that they
are needed to represent positions that reflect the overall "public
interest." Rather, their role is to represent parties that decisionmakers may not have fully heard, and to vindicate rights that decisionmakers have overlooked or illegitimately compromised. "Public interest law" thus refers not to a particular legal viewpoint but
to a need within the representation process itself:
In simple fact the term "public interest law" is used to cover
loosely a number of things that seem to be different from one
another and that have grown up at different points in time. The
unifying factor in all of these enterprises is that they are attempts
to provide legal representation for groups or interests that are
not normally able to command legal services in the marketplace
with their own resources ....
...
[These] are all, in one way or another, attempts to give
access to the decisionmaking processes to interests that would
otherwise be unrepresented or poorly represented. The underlying assumption is that these are important interests and that the
public at large will benefit if they are taken into consideration.3
Financing public interest law, always a formidable task, 4 became especially difficult in the wake of Alveska Pipeline Service Co. v.
Wilderness Society. 5 There the Supreme Court concluded that federal courts generally could not award attorneys' fees to public interest plaintiffs without express statutory authorization. Congress
2 Marshall, Financing Public Interest Law Practice: The Role of the Organized Bar, 61

A.B.A.J. 1487, 1487-88 (1975).
3
J. Feuillan, Opening Up the Legal Process 2 (Oct. 6, 1976) (discussion paper prepared for the Conference on Public Interest Law sponsored by the New York State Bar
Association Special Committee on Public Interest Law) (on file at the Cornell Law Review).
4 For a discussion of the various means of financing public interest law, and the difficulties involved both before and after Alyeska, see COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW,
BALANCING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: FINANCING PUBLIC INTEREST LAW IN AMERICA

(1976) [hereinafter cited as C.P.I.L. REPORT].
5 421 U.S. 240 (1975).

219-337
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has already responded to the financial predicament posed by
Alyeska for public interest lawyers, 6 but there has been no corresponding state action. We argue that state legislatures should pass
broad fee-shifting statutes authorizing fee awards to public interest
litigants. This reform will revitalize the fairness and enforcement
goals blunted by Alyeska. In addition, it will facilitate institutionalization of public interest law and encourage use of state forums to
resolve state-based disputes. Properly drafted state legislation will
achieve these ends through familiar mechanisms proven workable
in the pre-Alveska period.
I
Alyeska
A.

AND ITS IMPACT

The "PrivateAttorney General" Concept Before Alyeska

Under the traditional "American rule," courts cannot assess
attorneys' fees against the losing party. However, federal and state
courts have developed expansive exceptions to the American rule.
Thus, courts may award attorneys' fees to a party whose opponent
acts in bad faith.9 Likewise, courts may award attorneys' fees to
plaintiffs whose efforts produce a common fund accruing to the
benefit of an ascertainable class. 10 Prior to Alyeska, the "private
attorney general" principle had made considerable headway toward joining the "bad faith" and "common fund" doctrines as exceptions to the American rule."
6

See, e.g., Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (Supp.
1977).
This article has its roots in the work of the New York State Bar Association's Special
Committee on Public Interest Law. Formed in 1975, this Committee has sought practical
solutions to the problems posed by Alyeska.
8
See, e.g., Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967).
9 For an example of a pre-Alveska construction of the bad-faith exception, see Sims v.
Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691 (M.D. Ala.) (per curiam) (three-judge court) (attorneys' fees
awarded on "private attorney general" basis after showing of bad faith), aff'd mer., 409
U.S. 942 (1972).
10 Some courts, intent on continuing the "private attorney general" principle under a
new guise, have expanded the common-fund and bad-faith exceptions. See, e.g., Doe v.
Poelker, 515 F.2d 541, 547-48 (8th Cir. 1975) (bad-faith exception), rev'd per curiam, 97
S. Ct. 2391 (1977). For a discussion of this trend, see notes 77-94 and accompanying
text infra.
11For histories and summaries of cases construing the "private attorney general" principle, see M. DERFNER, ATTORNEYS' FEES IN PRo BONO PUBLICO CASES (Lawyers' Comm. for
Civil Rights 1972 & Supp. 1974). For discussions of the theory's development, see Dawson,
Lawyers and InvoluntarN Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88 HARV. L. REv. 849 (1975); King
& Plater, The Right to Counsel Fees in Public Interest Environmental Litigation, 41 TENN. L. R~v.
27 (1973); McLaughlin, Tie Recovery of Attorney's Fees: A Neu' Method of Financing Legal
Services, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 761 (1972); Nussbaum, Attorney's Fees in Public Interest
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The "private attorney general" concept grew out of the longestablished common-fund exception, first applied by the Supreme
Court in Trustees v. Greenough.12 In Greenough, a bondholder won a
judgment that preserved a fund in which he shared a common
interest with other bondholders. The bondholders then made a
considerable amount of money from management of the fund by
court-appointed agents. Exercising equitable powers, the Court
awarded attorneys' fees out of the fund in order to avoid undue
hardship to the plaintiff and an unfair advantage to the other
3
bondholders.1
In Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank,' 4 a 1939 decision, the Supreme Court significantly expanded the common-fund exception.
A depositor, by obtaining a judgment against an insolvent bank,
established claims of other depositors against the bank. The Court
approved a fee award to the plaintiff, even though
the judgment
15
did not create a fund for the other depositors.
Whether one professes to sue representatively or formally makes
a fund available for others may, of course, be a relevant circumstance in making the fund liable for his costs in producing it. But
when such a funid is for all practical purposes created for the
benefit of others, the formalities of the litigation-the absence of
an avowed class suit or the creation of a fund, as it were, through
stare decisis rather than through a decree-hardly touch the
power of equity in doing justice as between a party and the
16
beneficiaries of his litigation.
Thus Sprague shows the common-fund exception to be a flexible
doctrine of equity, under which courts may award fees if the in7
terests of justice so require.'
Litigation, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 301 (1973); Note, Awarding Attorney and Expert Witness Fees in
Environmental Litigation, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1222 (1973); Note, Awarding Attorneys' Fees to
the "PrivateAttorney General":Judicial Green Light to Private Litigation in the Public Interest, 24
HASTINGS L.J. 733 (1973); Note, The Allocation of Attorney's Fees after Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Co., 38 U. CHi. L. REv. 316 (1971); Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access
to the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 636 (1974).
12 105 U.S. 527 (1882).
13 Id. at 532.
14307 U.S. 161 (1939).
5 Id. at 167.
1
6 Id. The Court stated, however, that "such allowances are appropriate only in exceptional circumstances and for dominating reasons of justice." Id.
17In Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1966), the
Court refused to extend Sprague, holding that, in statutory cases, attorneys' fees would not
be awarded unless expressly authorized either by statute or by a longstanding equitable
exception to the American rule. Id. at 719-20.
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Greenough, Sprague, and other common-fund cases' 8 articulated policies that laid the foundation for a "private attorney general" exception. The primary goal underlying common-fund fee
awards was to avoid the unfairness inherent in forcing a plaintiff
who bestows benefits on many to bear alone the expenses of
litigation.' 9 Later, the Supreme Court recognized that such fee
awards also serve to encourage lawsuits that benefit deserving nonlitigants.20 Lower federal courts extended the original commonfund doctrine, realizing that the same policy considerations apply
even where the benefits of litigation are not in the form of a fund
against which fees can be assessed. 2 ' Moreover, these courts came
to see that private attorneys general, if given an incentive to sue,
could protect important national interests not limited to a clearly
22
definable class.
New York has a well-developed common-fund exception. In Gerzof v. Sweeney, 22
N.Y.2d 297, 239 NE.2d 521, 292 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1968), a taxpayer challenged a village's
purchase of a generator. The seller, along with the mayor and certain trustees, had violated the state competitive bidding statute, and the Court of Appeals ordered a refund of
the difference between the purchase price and the price of the generator the village should
have bought. Id. at 307-08, 239 N.E.2d at 525, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 646-47. The court also
awarded attorneys' fees: "[T]he plaintiff, having succeeded in the action for the benefit of
the Village, is entitled to an allowance of counsel fees . . . out of the fund created by his
efforts." Id. at 308, 239 N.E.2d at 526, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 647. See also Nance v. Town of
Oyster Bay, 54 Misc. 2d 274, 282 N.Y.S.2d 324 (Sup. Ct. 1967), aff'd men., 30 App. Div. 2d
918, 293 N.Y.S.2d 704 (2d Dep't 1968).
New York courts have also engaged in a rudimentary "substantial benefit" test. For
example, in Murray v. Kelly, 14 App. Div. 2d 528, 217 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1st Dep't) (per
curiam), aff'd mem., 11 N.Y.2d 810, 182 N.E.2d 109, 227 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1961), the court
stated:
It is not essential, to justify the allowance of counsel fees in a class action such as
this, that the applicants prove the creation of a fund for the benefit of the class
through their efforts. It suffices that as a result of the litigation, various benefits
were obtained for the members [of the class] ....
Id. at 528, 217 N.Y.S.2d at 147. Plaintiffs in Murray received attorneys' fees even though
they did not prevail on the merits.
18
E.g., Ojeda v. Hackney, 452 F.2d 947 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); Gibbs v. Blackwelder, 346 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1965).
19See Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. at 532; Note, supra note 11, 24 HASTINGS L.J.
at 736,
739-40.
2
°See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 396 (1970); Note, supra note 11, 24
HASTINGS L.J. at 741. See generally Dawson, supra note 11, at 895; Nussbaum, supra note 11,
at 318.
21See, e.g., Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 366 F. Supp. 18, 22 (N.D. Cal. 1973), opinion
supplemented, 64 F.R.D. 680 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd per curiam, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977),
cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3182 (Oct. 3, 1977). Cf. Murray v. Kelly, 14 App. Div. 2d 528,
217 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1st Dep't 1961) (per curiam) (in New York creation of common fund not
essential for fee award), aff'd ner., 11 N.Y.2d 810, 182 N.E.2d 109, 227 N.Y.S.2d 435
(1962). See also Nussbaum, supra note 11, at 333-34.
22
See, e.g., Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143, 145 (5th Cir. 1971); La
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By acknowledging the vitality of these policies, the Supreme
Court's 1968 decision in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises23 sparked
development of the "private attorney general" doctrine. Although
Piggie Park involved a fee award authorized under Title II of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,24 it set forth compelling policy arguments
in support of fee awards even where not authorized by statute.
When a plaintiff brings an action under [Title II], he cannot
recover damages. If he obtains an injunction, he does so not for
himself alone but also as a "private attorney general," vindicating
a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority. If successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own attorneys' fees, few aggrieved parties would be in a position to advance the public interest by invoking the injunctive powers of the
federal courts. Congress therefore enacted the provision for
counsel fees-not simply to penalize litigants who deliberately advance arguments they know to be untenable but, more broadly,
to encourage individuals injured by racial discrimination to seek
judicial relief under Title 11.25
The Court held that a party prevailing under Title II should ordinarily receive attorneys' fees "unless special circumstances would
render such an award unjust. ' 26 No such circumstances existed in
Piggie Park; therefore, the Court awarded "reasonable counsel fees
2 7
as part of the costs to be assessed against the respondents.
In Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,28 decided in 1970, the Supreme Court significantly expanded the common-fund exception,
and seemed to clear the way for a nonstatutory "private attorney
general" doctrine. In Mills, the Court awarded attorneys' fees to
plaintiffs who had brought an action under federal securities law to
prevent use of misleading proxy statements. Unlike the remedies
obtained in Greenough and Sprague, the judgment awarded in Mills
did not create a monetary gain for either the plaintiff or the other
shareholders. Justice Harlan, writing for an eight-man majority,
relied on the concept of "corporate therapeutics":
[A]ctions of this sort "involve corporate therapeutics," and furnish a benefit to all shareholders by providing an important
Raza Unida v. Volpe, 57 F.R.D. 94, 99 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (supplementing 337 F. Supp. 221
(N.D. Cal. 1972)), aff'd, 488 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1973), Cert. denied, 417 U.S. 968 (1974).
23 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam).
24 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (1970).
25 390 U.S. at 402 (footnotes omitted).
26/d.
2

7 Id. at 403.
28 396 U.S. 375

(1970). See notes 82-83 and accompanying text infra.
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means of enforcement of the proxy statute. To award attorneys'
fees in such a suit to a plaintiff who has succeeded in establishing
a cause of action is not to saddle the unsuccessful party with the
expenses but to impose them on the class that has benefited from
them and that would have had to pay them had it brought the
suit.

29

Mills was the first case in which the Court applied the commonfund exception to a situation where the plaintiff brought suit
under a statute that did not specifically authorize attorneys' fees
awards.3 0 The Mills Court sanctioned a recovery "where the litigation has conferred a substantial benefit on the members of an
ascertainable class, and where the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit makes possible an award that will operate to
spread the costs proportionately among them. 31I Although the
corporation in Mills served as a conduit through which the attorneys' fees could be spread to other shareholders, the language
used by the Court seemed to expand the common-fund theory
into a "common benefit" exception.3 2 The nonstatutory award granted in Mills, read in conjunction with Piggie Park,3 3 apparently
created a full-fledged, "private attorney general" principle of "legal
' a4
therapeutics."
29 396 U.S. at 396-97 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Murphy v. North American Light &
Power Co., 33 F. Supp. 567, 570 (S.D.N.Y. 1940)).
30Thus Mills undercut the strength of Fleischmann. See note 17 supra.
31 396 U.S. at 393-94. For an explanation of common-benefit cases, see F.D. Rich Co.
v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 130 (1974).
32 See Dawson, supra note 11, at 896-97.
33 In Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971), the court
sought to synthesize Mills and Piggie Park. It concluded that Mills rested primarily on the
idea that "private suits are necessary to effectuate congressional policy and that awards of
attorney's fees are necessary to encourage private litigants to initiate such suits." Id. at 145.
The court also applied the reasoning of Piggie Park, holding that a plaintiff successful
under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) is entitled to attorneys' fees absent special circumstances. Id.
at 147. Knight v. Auciello, 453 F.2d 852 (1st Cir. 1972) (per curiam), also involved an
action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1982; the court of appeals held that the trial court had
abused its discretion by refusing to award attorneys' fees:
The violation of an important public policy may involve little by way of actual
damages, so far as a single individual is concerned, or little in comparison with the
cost of vindication .... In such instances public policy may suggest an award of
costs that will remove the burden from the shoulders of the plaintiff seeking to
vindicate the public right.
Id. at 853. The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976 (42 U.S.C.A. § 1988
(Supp. 1977)) in effect codifies the results of these two cases. See note 55 infra.
34
House Subcomnittee Hearings, supra note 1, at 83 (prepared statement of Armand
Derfner, Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights). Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973), was the last
major Supreme Court decision to enhance the prospects for an established "private attorney general" principle. The defendant union lost on the merits under the free speech
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Before Alyeska, the "private attorney general" principle frequently worked in lower federal courts to encourage vindication of
important rights held equally by all citizens. Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA35 (NRDC) is illustrative. The plaintiffs requested attorneys' fees "for their efforts in obtaining orders requiring EPA to comply with certain of its obligations under the Clean
Air Amendments of 1970."36 The Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit granted plaintiffs' request:
The public suit seems particularly instrumental to the statutory
scheme when against the EPA itself, for only the publiccertainly not the polluter-has the incentive to complain if the
EPA falls short in one or another respect; yet the lack of measurable interest on the part of any individual member of the public,
and the difficulties inherent in complex litigation in a rapidly
developing field of law, make the economics of citizen suits a
serious problem.
In any event, petitioners have activated traditional adversary
machinery for bringing issues before a court. As a result, policies
of the EPA have been corrected and others, upheld, have been
removed from the arena of dispute. Presumptively the public has
benefitted-not only in Rhode Island and Massachusetts but nationally, as neither air pollution nor the movement of citizenry
respect [sic] state boundaries, and some of the legal principles at
issue have national as well as regional import. Petitioners have
provision of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 412-531
(Supp. V 1975)). The Court affirmed an award of attorneys' fees to the plaintiff union
member, concluding that the plaintiff, by vindicating his right to free speech, had conferred
a benefit on the union and all of its members. 412 U.S. at 15. Thus the Court relied
directly on the common-benefit rationale, indicating an even greater willingness to adopt
openly a "private attorney general" doctrine.
One commentator has suggested that Mills and other federal cases are more in the
nature of "private attorney general" litigation, although couched as common-benefit cases.
Dawson, supra note 11, at 895. Common-benefit principles do not adequately explain the
policy justifications behind "private attorney general" actions-namely, to encourage private enforcement actions that raise issues of public policy and to provide sufficient compensation to attract competent counsel. At least in theory, a common benefit to the public
always results from this enforcement process. The common-benefit analysis in Mills creates
too restrictive and result-oriented a test on which to base financing of public interest litigation.
One critic has observed that "[r]equiring a showing of both statutory vindication and a
class wide benefit, would seem to entail a largely redundant demonstration. That is, in most
cases the act of vindicating congressional policy will ipso facto confer a benefit upon
plaintiff's class." Note, supra note 11, 24 HASTINGS L.J. at 749 (emphasis in original).
35484 F.2d 1331 (Ist Cir. 1973).
36Id. at 1332. The Clean Air Amendments of 1970 are codified in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-5 to 1858a (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
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thus helped to enforce, refine and clarify the law. They can be

37
said to have assisted the EPA in achieving its statutory goals.

Eight weeks after the First Circuit decided NRDC, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed in La Raza Unida v. Volpe. 38 There, plaintiffs had
succeeded in enjoining at the district-court level a California highway project on the grounds that defendants had failed to comply
with the Department of Transportation Act and federal housing
relocation provisions. 3 9 La Raza Unida's importance lies in District
Judge Peckham's list of factors that influence application of the
"private attorney general" principle:
a) The effectuation of strong Congressional policies ....
b) The number of people who have benefited from plaintiffs'
efforts ....
c) The necessity, and financial burden, of private enforcement
40

In elaborating on the third criterion, the court stated:
Responsible representatives of the public should be encouraged to
sue, particularly where governmental entities are involved as defendants. As the amicus brief points out, only private citizens can

be expected to "guard the guardians."
However, these exhortations towards citizen participation can
sound somewhat hollow against the background of the economic

realities of vigorous litigation. In many "public interest" cases
only injunctive relief is sought, and the average attorney or litigant must hesitate, if not shudder, at the thought of "taking on"
an entity such as the California Department of Highways, with
no prospect of financial compensation for the efforts and ex-

penses rendered. The expense of litigation in such a case poses
a formidable, if not insurmountable, obstacle.
37 484 F.2d at 1334. The court also had little difficulty in skirting the general prohibition of sovereign immunity. Congress has waived the government's sovereign immunity
from "a judgment for costs," but this waiver does not extend to attorneys' fees awards
"[e~xcept as otherwise specifically provided by statute." 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1970). The court
of appeals held that the section of the Clean Air Act authorizing attorneys' fees awards in
district courts (42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(d) (1970)) applied to the section under which plaintiffs
sued, which provides for review in the courts of appeals "of the Administrator's action in
approving or promulgating any implementation plan" (id. § 1857h-5(b)(1)). 484 F.2d at
1338.
38 57 F.R.D. 94 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (supplementing 337 F. Supp. 221 (N.D. Cal. 1972)),
affd, 488 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 968 (1974).
39 337 F. Supp. at 233-34.
40 57 F.R.D. at 99-100.
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Hence, the fact that only a private party could be reason-

ably expected to bring this action is one additional
factor support41
ing the awarding of attorneys' fees in this case.
By 1975, lower federal courts had transformed goals of enforcement and fairness into the "private attorney general" doctrine. Mills and Piggie Park all but ensured that the Supreme Court
would bless this new exception to the American rule. Then came
A lyeska.
B.

The Alyeska Decision

On March 20, 1970, the United States Department of the Interior submitted to the Council on Environmental Quality a study
recommending construction of the Alaskan pipeline. 42 Three environmental groups43 sued to enjoin construction of the pipeline
on the theory that it violated the National Environmental Policy
Act of 196944 (NEPA). The court of appeals never ruled on this
contention, but instead held that the Secretary of the Interior's
grant to Alyeska of a special land-use permit violated the Mineral
Lands Leasing Act. 45 The court of appeals decision, however, ac46
knowledged congressional authority to dispose of public lands.
47
Congress in turn quickly authorized construction of the pipeline,
48
dispensing with the need for further compliance with NEPA.
Following these developments, the court of appeals granted
plaintiffs' request for expenses and attorneys' fees:
[T]he equities of this particular case support an award of attorneys' fees to the successful plaintiffs-appellants. Acting as private
attorneys general, not only have they ensured the proper functioning of our system of government, but they have advanced
and protected in a very concrete manner substantial public in41 Id.
42

at 100-01 (footnote omitted).
For a summary of events leading up to the litigation in Alyeska, see Alyeska Pipeline

Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 241-44 (1975).
43 These groups were The Wilderness Society, The Environmental Defense Fund, Inc.,
and Friends of the Earth.
44 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970).
45 Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 847 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917
(1973). The Mineral Lands Leasing Act is codified at 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1970) (amended
1973).
46 479 F.2d at 891.

41 Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, 87 Stat. 576, 584
(1973) (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 185 (Supp. V 1975) & 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1655 (Supp. V
1975)).
48 43 U.S.C. § 1652(d) (Supp. V 1975).
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terests. An award of fees would not have unjustly discouraged
appellee Alyeska from defending its case in court. And denying
fees might well have deterred appellants from undertaking the
49
heavy burden of this litigation.
Relying on the successor to an 1853 statutory limit on attorneys'
fees,5 0 the Supreme Court reversed:
Since the approach taken by Congress to this issue has been to
carve out specific exceptions to a general rule that federal courts
cannot award attorneys' fees beyond the limits of 28 U.S.C. §
1923, those courts are not free to fashion drastic new rules with
respect to the allowance of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party
in federal litigation or to pick and choose among plaintiffs and
the statutes under which they sue and to award fees in some
cases but not in others, depending upon the courts' assessment of
the importance of the public policies involved in particular
cases.

51

Thus, on May 12, 1975, ended one of the longest public interest cases in American history, and along with it, the development of a court-created "private attorney general" principle.
49 Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'd sub non.
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
50 28 U.S.C. § 1923 (1970).
51 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 269 (1975). The Court,
however, did not disturb
the historic power of equity to permit the trustee of a fund or property, or a party
preserving or recovering a fund for the benefit of others in addition to himself, to
recover his costs, including his attorneys' fees, from the fund or property itself or
directly from the other parties enjoying the benefit.
Id. at 257 (footnote omitted). Further, courts could continue to award fees where a party
willfully disobeyed a court order or where the losing party "acted in bad faith, vexatiously,
wantonly, or for oppressive reasons." Id. at 258-59. After Alyeska, two of these theories, the
common-fund and the bad-faith exceptions, received renewed attention from lower federal
courts. See notes 77-94 and accompanying text infra.
Mr. Justice Marshall, dissenting in Alyeska, observed that the majority failed to consider
the breadth of previously accepted fee-shifting theories. 421 U.S. at 277-78. Mr. Justice
Marshall also argued that instead of rejecting the "private attorney general" principle, the
Court should place
[t~he reasonable cost of the plaintiff's representation.., upon the defendant if (1)
the important right being protected is one actually or necessarily shared by the
general public or some class thereof; (2) the plaintiff's pecuniary interest in the
outcome, if any, would not normally justify incurring the cost of counsel; and (3)
shifting that cost to the defendant would effectively place it on a class that benefits
from the litigation.
Id. at 284-85. Mr. Justice Marshall did not, however, consider whether the propriety
of attorneys' fees awards should depend solely on the "importance" of the statutory right.

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63:173

C.

The Impact of Alyeska on Public Interest Practice
The Alyeska decision came at a particularly difficult time for
public interest law firms. From their inception, public interest law
firms, such as the Center for Law and Social Policy and the Puerto
Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, have relied on foundation grants for a significant portion of their budgets. Before
Alyeska, major foundation donors had signaled their intent to phase
out financial support for these enterprises. 52 Because of increased
funding from court-awarded attorneys' fees, however, public interest law firms stood on the verge of becoming significant legal
institutions. Today, with decreases in foundation support and in
fee awards, the funding problems of many firms have become
critical.
Individual practitioners of public interest law have also felt the
impact of Alyeska. The Council for Public Interest Law5 3 recently
described the experiences of a Seattle lawyer who estimated devoting over one thousand hours to represent four hundred indigent
clients threatened with the loss of their homes because of a planned
new freeway. This attorney took the case expecting a fee award;
indeed, the trial court invited the lawyer to submit a fee application
after he had won on the merits. The Supreme Court decided
Alyeska shortly thereafter, and the lawyer found his small public
interest firm $56,000 poorer than expected. He explained his decision to cut back on future public interest work:
I just spent two years of my life fighting a freeway. As a result of
that case, the right of citizens to participate in decisions that
critically affect their lives was established. The homes of
thousands of people were saved. The taxpayers were saved millions of dollars. And I was paid less than three dollars an hour. I
54
can't afford to do it again.
Alyeska has had an even greater impact on private attorneys
who take on some public interest or pro bono cases each year. Eric
52 C.P.I.L. REPORT, supra note 4, at 238-40.

As a safeguard against decreased funding, the American Bar Association joined with
three large foundations to fund a major new organization, the Council for Public Interest
Law in Washington, D.C. The Council is charged with developing stable sources of financial support for public interest law groups. For an account of the Council's activities, see 61
A.B.A.J. 769 (1975).
11 C.P.I.L. REPORT, supra note 4, at 315. Public interest lawyers across the nation tell
the same story. A survey conducted by the Council for Public Interest Law found that
Alyeska adversely affected pending claims held by 34 out of 44 responding private firms
with a substantial public interest practice. Id. at 318.
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Schnapper, an attorney with the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, discussed the aftermath of Alveska in this context:
The real impact of the ruling will be in terms of our work with
private attorneys in the South. Awarded fees have never been a
significant part of our budget ....

In most cases we work with

private lawyers, and it matters to them in terms of the amount of
civil rights work they are willing to take on.
When we go to a guy now in the South, and ask him to take on a
prison case, most of which are brought under these older laws,
he'll say he can't do it. He'll have to put thousands of hours into
it without any hope of getting paid. It will be different if we ask
him to take an employment case under the 1964 Civil Rights Act
55
because he can anticipate some fee award if he wins it.
Al'eska, it seems, has discouraged all but the most public-spirited
private practitioners from accepting public interest cases. Yet because they comprise the overwhelming majority of practicing attorneys, private practitioners hold the key to providing adequate
public interest representation.
D. Alyeska's Direct Impact
With Alyeska, the Supreme Court stopped the "private attorney
general" concept dead in its tracks. Since that decision, a new rule
has quickly taken hold: Absent statutory authorization, "federal
courts have the power to award fees only in cases of bad faith or of
benefit to a limited class of special beneficiaries against whom the
award is taxed. '5 6 Thus Alveska has effectively limited "private attorney general" recoveries to cases involving the bad-faith5 7 or
common-fund 5 8 exception.
55Id. at 316 (quoting Witt, After Alyeska: Can the Contender Survive?, JURIs DoCTOR, Oct.
1975, at 34, 40). The enactment of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976
(Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (Supp. 1977))) now
encourages representation of civil rights claims. See notes 66-76 and accompanying text
infra. The House Committee considering the bill stated that it had "received evidence that
private lawyers were refusing to take certain types of civil rights cases because the civil
rights bar, already short of resources, could not afford to do so." H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1976). Although necessarily limited to the civil rights legislation before
the House, the Committee's conclusion that attorneys' fees legislation would "insure that
reasonable fees are awarded to attract competent counsel" (id. at 9) states a principle of
general application.
56 Committee on Civic Rights v. Romney, 518 F.2d 71, 72 (Ist Cir. 1975). See North
Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc. v. Jones, 409 F. Supp. 937, 940 (E.D.N.C.), prob. juris.
noted, 429 U.S. 976 (1976).
'7 See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
" See notes 12-19 and accompanying text supra.
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Although Alyeska applies only to federal courts, it has had a far
broader impact. Most importantly, Alyeska has checked further judicial development of the "private attorney general" doctrine at the
state level.5 9 In California, for example, the Court of Appeals for
the Second District recently cited Alveska in refusing to award at60
torneys' fees:
In light of the rejection by the United States Supreme Court of
the "private attorney general" concept, and of the reluctance of
our own Supreme Court to approve it, it would be highly inappropriate for this court to pioneer to the extent plaintiffs ask us.
If California is to adopt the broad rule, it must either be by
61
legislative action or by a decision of the Supreme Court.
Alyeska has even influenced administrative agencies. Before Alyeska,
the Federal Communications Commission had edged toward a
"private attorney general" theory in favor of intervenors in administrative proceedings; 62 Alyeska brought this exploratory activity
to a halt:
The reasoning of the Supreme Court in Alyeska Pipeline Co. v.
Wildnerness Society is fully applicable to litigation before the
Federal Communications Commission. Congress has no more extended a "roving commission" to the FCC than it has to the
Judiciary "to allow counsel fees as costs or otherwise whenever
63
the ...[Commission] might deem them warranted."

E.

The Response to Alyeska

1. Legislation
Alyeska has triggered two major legislative responses. The first
came as an amendment to section 14 of the Voting Rights Act of
5
'
9See,

e.g., Chicago v. Illinois Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 34 Ill. App. 3d 114,
339 N.E.2d 260 (1975), aff'd, 65 Ill. 2d 108, 357 N.E.2d 1154 (1976).
60The "private attorney general" theory has struggled for three years in California.
For examples of the California courts' refusal to employ the "private attorney general"
theory, see D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners, 11 Cal. 3d 1, 520 P.2d 10, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 786 (1974); Mandel v. Hodges, 54 Cal. App. 3d 987, 127 Cal. Rptr. 244 (1976);
Douglas v. Los Angeles Herald-Examiner, 50 Cal. App. 3d 449, 123 Cal. Rptr. 683 (1975).
61Menge v. Farmers Ins. Group, 50 Cal. App. 3d 143, 148, 123 Cal. Rptr. 265, 268
(1976). The California Supreme Court has recently moved towards adoption of a broad
rule. In Serrano v. Priest, 46 U.S.L.W. 2188 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Oct. 18, 1977), the court upheld
a fee award based squarely on a "private attorney general" theory. Id. at 2189. For a
discussion of Serrano, see note 95 infra.
62
' See, e.g., Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 465 F.2d
519 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'g KCMC, Inc., 25 F.C.C.2d 603 (1970).
63 Turner v. FCC, 514 F.2d 1354, 1356 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (footnote omitted) (quoting
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. at 260). See Greene County Planning Bd. v.FPC, 559 F.2d 1227, 1239-40 (2d Cir. 1977) (rehearing denied en banc).
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1965: "In any action or proceeding to enforce the voting guarantees of the fourteenth or fifteenth amendment, the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.

' 64

The Re-

port of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary discusses the
amendment's underlying purpose:
Such a provision is appropriate in voting rights cases because
there, as in employment and public accommodations cases, and
other civil rights cases, Congress depends heavily upon private
citizens to enforce the fundamental rights involved. Fee awards
are a necessary means of enabling private citizens to vindicate
6
these Federal rights.

5

The second response came shortly before the close of congressional business for 1976, when the House and Senate passed almost
66
identical versions of a Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act.

Senator Tunney, the chief sponsor of the act, described the Senate
version as follows:
The purpose and effect of this bill is [sic] simple-it is to
allow the courts to provide the traditional remedy of reasonable
counsel fee awards to private citizens who must go to court to
vindicate their rights under our civil rights statutes. The Supreme Court's recent Alyeska decision has required specific
statutory authorization if Federal courts are to continue previous
policies of awarding fees under all Federal civil rights statutes ....
In the typical case that arises under these statutes the citizen
whose rights have been violated has little or no money with
which to hire a lawyer, and there is often no damage claim from
which an attorney could draw his fee. If private citizens are to be
able to assert their rights under these laws-if those who violate
these most basic human freedoms are not to proceed with
to recover
impunity-then citizens must have the opportunity
67
what it costs them to vindicate these rights in court.

The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 197668

vWill

have an enormous practical effect on civil rights litigation. The act,
a major inroad on Alyeska, authorizes attorneys' fees awards in all
64Voting Rights Act of 1965--Extension, Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 402(e), 89 Stat. 494
(1975) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 19731(e) (Supp. V 1975)).
65 S. REP. No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 40, reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.

NEws 774, 807.
6 S. 2778, H.R. 15460, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975).
67 121 CONG. REC. S14,975 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1975).
68 Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (Supp. 1977)).
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civil rights actions arising out of federal statutes enacted since
1866.69 It therefore covers the oldest and most-used civil rights
acts,'7 0 as well as statutes barring discrimination in federally funded
programs, 71 in employment practices, 72 and in certain property
transactions.7 3 Modeled on previous civil rights attorneys' fees
legislation,7 4 the act allows a court to award a prevailing party
"reasonable" attorneys' fees in accordance with existing case-law
standards. 75 In a recent employment discrimination decision, a
Manhattan district judge applying the act awarded fees to a public
interest law firm at the rate of $100-110 per "partner hour" and
$60 per "associate hour"; the total award, including a "premium"
above costs, came to $375,000.76 Such substantial awards will have
a considerable impact on lawyers' willingness to undertake public
interest litigation and on defendants' willingness to delay or prolong litigation for purely strategic reasons.
2.

Trend Toward Judicial Circumvention of Alyeska

To counteract the inhibitory effects of Alveska, some courts
77
have moved toward an expanded construction of the bad-faith
and common-fund 78 exceptions. Miller v. Carson79 typifies this
69An amendment from the Senate floor added a provision authorizing the award of
attorneys' fees to taxpayers who successfully defend frivolous or vexatious I.R.S. suits. 122
CONG. REC. S17,050 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1976).
70 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 (originally enacted as Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27,
reenacted by Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144), 1983 (originally enacted as
Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13), & 1985 (originally enacted as Act of Apr. 20,
1871, ch. 22, § 2, 17 Stat. 13-14) (1970).
71 Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (Supp. V 1975); Civil
Rights Act of 1964, tit. VI, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1970).
72 Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp.
V 1975).
73 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14
Stat. 27).
74For a legislative history of the act, see SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG. 2D SESS., THE CIVIL RIGHTS ATTORNEY'S
FEES AWARDS ACT OF 1976, SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, TEXTS, AND OTHER
DOCUMENTS 8 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as SOURCE BOOK]; Larson, The Civil

Rights Attorneys Fees Awards Act of 1976, 10 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 778, 779-80 (1977).
75 SOURCE BOOK, supra note 74, at 12 (Senate Comm. Report), 216-17 (House Comm.
Report). The act will probably permit attorneys' fees awards in many welfare cases (see

Note, 1976 Developments in Welfare Law-Aid to Families with Dependent Children, 62 CORNELL
L. REV. 1050, 1060-76 (1977)), but even this result is unclear (see id. at 1072 n.163).
76 Transcript of Hearing on Attorneys' Fees Award at 177-81, Beazer v. New York

City Transit Auth., 414 F. Supp. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (Griesa, J.), modified, 558 F.2d 97 (2d
Cir. 1977) (eliminating premium).
7'See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
,sSee notes 12-19 and accompanying text supra.

79401 F. Supp. 835 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
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trend. A group of pretrial detainees brought a civil rights class
action, seeking a declaration that prison conditions were constitutionally unacceptable. The plaintiffs won on the merits, but a considerable delay ensued before the jail authorities began to correct
the conditions. Plaintiffs returned to the district court to seek enforcement, and were granted attorneys' fees on both bad-faith and
common-fund rationales. The district court, noting that Alyeska
preserved these two exceptions,8 0 concluded that the commonfund theory applied despite the absence of a monetary recovery. 8 '
The Miller court based its reasoning on Mills v. Electric AutoLite Co.,82 where the Supreme Court held that the absence of a
"common fund" in a shareholder derivative suit did not preclude
the award of attorneys' fees to plaintiffs' counsel. The Miller court
interpreted Mills to mean "that where a substantial benefit is conferred upon members of an ascertainable class, recovery of such a
fund is not an absolute prerequisite to the applicability of the
'common benefit' doctrine. 8 3 In Miller, plaintiffs rendered a substantial benefit "not only to themselves but to all citizens of Duval
County. Conditions in a jail which resulted in cruel and unusual
punishment and a denial of equal protection and due process disserve the entire public by fostering recidivism and perpetuating
antisocial behavior." 84 The Miller court thus attempted to blunt the
thrust of Alyeska by liberally applying the common-fund rationale
of Mills.
But a glance at another post-Alyeska decision reveals that the
fee award in Miller, although couched in common-fund language,
actually rests on the "private attorney general" theory outlawed by
Alyeska. In Burbank v. Twomey, 85 state prisoners challenging prison
disciplinary procedures lost both on the merits and in their application for attorneys' fees. Rejecting arguments analogous to those
that convinced the Miller court, the Seventh Circuit stated:
[T]he "class" which was purportedly benefited by this lawsuit is,
according to the plaintiff, composed of all Illinois prisoners. This
class and the benefit to each member is clearly too indefinite to
permit recovery under the "common fund" theory ....
[T]he
rationale of the "common fund" theory is to distribute the costs
80
Id.
81

at 849.
Id. at 851.
82 396 U.S. 375 (1970). For a discussion of the impact Mills had on the development of
the "private attorney general" doctrine, see Dawson, supra note 11, at 895; notes 28-34 and
accompanying text supra.
83 401 F. Supp. at 851.
8
4 Id. at 853.
85520 F.2d 744 (7th Cir. 1975).
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of litigation among those benefiting from the judgment and not
86
to shift the costs between adverse parties.

The class involved in Miller was likewise not "ascertainable," and
therefore the common-fund rationale invoked in that case dissolves
into a "private attorney general" theory. We sympathize with the
result in Miller, but we believe that the Burbank court more accu-

87
rately perceived the state of the law after Alyeska.
The Miller court also based its award of attorneys' fees on the
bad-faith exception. In Miller, the defendant delayed in obeying
the original court order and deliberately left jail conditions as they
existed before the litigation commenced. Describing these actions
as "unreasonable and obdurately obstinate, ' 88 the court found that
the defendant's bad faith justified the fee award to the plaintiffs.8 9
The court's application of this theory, unlike its application of the
common-fund exception, reflects a legitimate reading of precedent. 90

As Miller illustrates, courts have made frequent use of the
bad-faith exception. 9 ' The recent Supreme Court decision in
86

7

/d. at 49.
17 Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 395 F. Supp. 1275 (W.D. Pa. 1975), reinforces
this conclusion. In Samuel, the court stated:
To my thinking, previous cases which have awarded fees using a "common benefit" rationale-that is, awarded fees in the absence of monetarily quantifiable
benefit-have in reality involved the less-than-precise application of the private
attorney general rationale, for without a fund, out of which it can apportion fees,
the Court is left to justify the very shifting of fees to the unsuccessful party expressly disapproved in Alyeska.
Id. at 1283. For a post-Alyeska decision correctly applying the common-benefit rationale, see
Cox v. International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 398 F. Supp. 239 (N.D. Ga.

1975) (class benefited comprised all members of union).
88 401 F. Supp. at 857.
89Id.

90In F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116 (1974), the Supreme Court
noted that the bad-faith doctrine applies when an opponent acts "vexatiously, wantonly, or
for oppressive reasons." Id. at 129. See also Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 15 (1973) ("It is clear
... that 'bad faith' may be found, not only in the actions that led to the lawsuit, but also in
the conduct of the litigation.").
To avoid abuse of this standard, the court of appeals in Adams v. Carlson, 521 F.2d
168 (7th Cir. 1975), noted that
[v]igorous litigation in an area in which the law is so unsettled should not be
equated with obduracy, wantonness, vexatiousness, or oppression .... Our reading of the record is not inconsistent with a finding that the defendants as public
servants were engaged in good faith litigation to the end of hammering out the
extent to which constitutional rights were to be accorded to prisoners. That some
of their contentions were not upheld is no basis for the entry of an award on a
punitive basis.
Id. at 170.
91 See, e.g., Richardson v. Communications Workers, 530 F.2d 126 (8th Cir.) (attorneys!
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Run yon v. McCrary,9 2 however, may make it more difficult for
civil rights litigants to escape Alyeska by use of this exception:
By stubbornly contesting the facts, the petitioners assert, the
[respondents] attempted to deceive the court and, in any event,
needlessly prolonged the litigation.
We cannot accept this argument.... [I]n this case the factual
predicate to a finding of bad faith is absent. Simply because the
facts were found against the [respondents] does not by itself
prove that threshold of irresponsible conduct for which a penalty
assessment would be justified. Whenever the facts in a case are
disputed, a court perforce must decide that one party's version is
inaccurate. Yet it would be untenable to conclude ipso facto that
that party had acted in bad faith. 93
This restrictive language indicates that litigants will not easily be
able to evade Alyeska by invoking the bad-fath exception. Moreover,
even expansive interpretation of the common-fund exception cannot address all the policies underlying the "private attorney gen94
eral" theory.
Only broad-based fee-shifting legislation can solve the funding problems left in the wake of Alyeska. Because attorneys' fees
awards, when soundly based, implement important social goals, we
believe it is necessary not simply to restore the pre-Alyeska law in its
application to state courts, but to improve upon it by clarifying
uncertain language.

95

fees awarded where defendant intentionally failed to perform fiduciary duty), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 824 (1976); Carter v. Noble, 526 F.2d 677 (5th Cir. 1976) (attorneys' fees
awarded because defendant's sole defense patently frivolous); Parker v. Shonfeld, 409 F.
Supp. 876 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (attorneys' fees awarded in light of jury finding that defendants acted maliciously, wantonly, or oppressively). But see, e.g., Shannon v. HUD, 409 F.
Supp. 1189 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (bureaucratic delay during litigation not evidence of defendant's bad faith).
92427 U.S. 160 (1976).
93 d. at 183-84.
9 The common-fund requirement of an identifiable class will preclude recovery when
it is most desirable--i.e., when the benefits of the litigation accrue to society at large.
95 In so doing, however, we must address the Supreme Court's fundamental concern
that "it would be difficult, indeed, for the courts, without legislative guidance, to consider
some statutes important and others unimportant and to allow attorneys' fees only in connection with the former." Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. at
263-64. Serrano v. Priest, 46 U.S.L.W. 2188 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Oct. 18, 1977), illustrates the
need for such legislative guidance. At an earlier stage of the litigation (18 Cal. 3d 728, 557
P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976)), two legal aid groups had shown California's public
school financing system to be in violation of the equal protection provisions of that state's
constitution (id. at 768-69, 557 P.2d at 953, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 369). Despite a statutory
provision that left attorneys' fees "to the agreement ... of the parties" unless "specifically
provided for by statute" (CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021 (West 1955)), the court upheld a
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II
A

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL FOR AWARDING
ATTORNEYS' FEES

Even before Alyeska, Congress encouraged enforcement of

federal policies by lifting the burden of compensating counsel from
those who brought suits under important statutes. The highly publicized environmental field is but one of the many areas in which
Congress encouraged private enforcement with fee awards. 96 The
"private attorney general" theory that underlies these statutes is
not merely a product of recent social legislation; numerous federal
statutes over the years have contained fee provisions similar to
97
modern enactments.
Although there has been substantial federal legislation, states
have done very little to encourage public interest litigation through
attorneys' fees awards. Only four states-Alaska, Georgia, Nevada,
and Oregon-have enacted general fee-shifting legislation.9" Most
states have been cautious in their approach:
[T]he pattern is generally that of providing for recovery of
attorney's fees as discrete remedial measures for effectuating
specific, narrowly conceived, policy objectives. For this purpose,
sometimes legislation calls for the inclusion of fees as costs on
behalf of "the prevailing party", irrespective of whether the
plaintiff or the defendant prevails. In some instances, on the
fee award of $400,000, basing its decision squarely on a "private attorney general" theory
(46 U.S.L.W. at 2189). A broad-based fee-shifting statute would allow courts to encourage
meritorious litigation without straining for equitable exceptions in the face of restrictive
statutory language or common-law prohibitions.
96 Section 12(a) of the Clean Air Amendments of 1970 (42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (1970)) is
a good example of an environmental "private attorney general" provision. In discussing
the attorneys' fees provision of the act (id. § 1857h-2(d)), the Senate Report states: "The
Courts should recognize that in bringing legitimate actions under this section citizens
would be performing a public service and in such instances the courts should award costs
of litigation to such party [sic]." S. RP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1970). There
are at least 90 federal statutes that contain provisions for attorneys' fees. For a list of these
statutory provisions, see SOURCE BOOK, supra note 74, at 303-13.
"7See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act § 16(b), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970); Interstate
Commerce Act § 8, 49 U.S.C. § 8 (1970); Packers and Stockyards Act § 309(f), 7 U.S.C.
§ 210(f) (1970).
98Alaska is the only state that has enacted legislation completely reversing the American rule. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.60.010 (1973). Georgia's legislation codifies the bad-faith
exception to the American rule. See GA. CODE ANN. § 20-1404 (1977). The Nevada statute
provides for discretionary awards of fees in civil actions involving less than $10,000. NEV.
REV. STAT. § 18.010(3) (1975). In the Oregon attorneys' fees provision, the amount in
controversy may not be greater than $1,000. The statute also lists a limited number of
seemingly unrelated types of civil actions in which fees are recoverable. See ORE. REV.
STAT. §§ 20.080-.098 (1975).
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other hand, only one-way fee shifting is provided for by having
fees included as costs only when a specified type of claim is
successfully vindicated in court. Such provisions reflect a legislative judgment that with respect to a given kind of interest, the
parties who are characteristically in position to have their rights
violated would ordinarily be in a weak economic position as contrasted with that of those who would be in position to violate the
rights in question. Another type of statute, allowing two-way fee
shifting only if the amount at stake is relatively small, indicates a
policy judgment that fee shifting is an element of justice in such
cases.

99

Although there are many possible solutions to the problem of

financing public interest litigation, 10 0 we focus on attorneys' fees
legislation for two reasons. First, legislative action would relieve the
immediate financial burden on public interest litigants by using
well-understood mechanisms and established institutions. Second,
only a legislative solution would ensure that private firms remain a

major source of public interest representation. As the following
pre-Alyeska observation indicates, only the involvement of the private bar can truly institutionalize public interest law:
[E]conomic factors are the most serious obstacle to the continued
growth of public interest litigation. Such lawsuits are complex
and time consuming, yet offer the attorney little prospect of
financial remuneration. This dilemma can be solved, however, by
awarding attorney's fees, as a matter of course, to private plaintiffs who successfully litigate important public issues that affect a
substantial segment of the population. The award of attorney's

" C.D. Sands, Influence of Denying Successful Litigants the Right to Recover Attorneys' Fees from the Losing Parties 7 (Feb. 22, 1975) (unpublished paper submitted to ABA
Special Comm. on Delivery of Legal Services) (on file at the Cornell Law Review).
t" For example, one solution would require that public interest firms charge fees in
accordance with their clients' abilities to pay. The tax impact of this scheme, however,
militates against its adoption. In 1975, the I.R.S. stated that although court-awarded fees
might not jeopardize a tax-exempt status (Rev. Rul. 75-75, 1975-1 C.B. 154), if a public
interest law firm "charges or accepts attorneys' fees from its clients, it is not distinguishable
from a private law firm and is not operating exclusively for charitable purposes. Accordingly, the organization does not qualify for exemption from Federal income tax under
section 501(c)(3) of the Code." Id.
Some solutions do not use private law firms to provide legal representation in public
interest cases. For example, New Jersey has established the Division of Public Interest in
the Department of the Public Advocate. The Division functions as a special prosecutor with
broad powers to bring civil suits against state agencies and private parties whose actions
affect the public interest. See C.P.I.L. REPORT, supra note 4, at 150-51. New York has a
small utility rate intervenor program, with a "public counsel" operating under the auspices
of the Consumer Protection Board. Id. at 160 n.15.
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fees will enable the newly established public interest law firms to
become self-supporting, thereby institutionalizing the career
lines of public interest lawyers. But more importantly, the award
of attorney's fees will make it financially possible for all
attorneys-whether sole practitioners or members of large law
firms-to include public interest cases as a regular part of their
practice. Only such wide-scale involvement by the private bar can
insure that all important public issues will be litigated. 10 1

State legislatures should move promptly to enact broad feeshifting statutes. Public interest litigants tend to submit their disputes to federal courts, instead of local tribunals, whenever any
arguable basis for federal jurisdiction exists. In part, this is attributable to factors that have nothing to do with the availability
of fee awards, such as more favorable substantive law or more competent and sympathetic judges. However, today more than ever
before the prospect of recouping attorneys' fees also influences
litigants to choose the federal forum. 10 2 Unless states adopt broad
fee-shifting legislation, federal courts will make further inroads
into resolution of state disputes.
Prompted by the diversity of approaches at the state level,
combined with the hesitancy and inertia of state legislatures in
enacting such legislation, the authors have drafted the following
fee-shifting statute.
"I1Nussbaum,

supra note 11, at 311. This message emerged repeatedly during the

1975 hearings of the California Senate Committee on Judiciary chaired by State Senator
Song. Armando Menocal of Public Advocates, Inc., testified:
[Piublic interest litigation is likely to involve matters that are legally or factually
complex, and, to many lawyers, even esoteric. Normally, neither private attorneys
nor the vast majority of clients can afford the investment of money and time that
such representation requires. For reasons that may be obvious, neither government nor private philanthropy alone can or should finance such legal representation; experience has shown that government funds are either explicitly or implicitly conditioned in ways that limit effective advocacy. Foundations or other
philanthropic sources of support, on the other hand, do not individually or even
collectively possess the means to adequately finance the work that is necessary,
even indulging the unwarranted assumption that most are inclined to do so.
Moreover, and perhaps most important, the vindication of important legal rights
should not depend upon the beneficense of private philanthropy or be subject to
the whim of government. Nor should it be made to depend upon the noblesse
oblige of the occasional attorney who may be willing to provide representation
without fee.
Private Attorneys General: Hearings on SB 664 Before the Comm. on Judiciary of the California
Senate 148-49 (Comm. Transcript 1975) (prepared statement of Armando Menocal, Public
Advocates, Inc., San Francisco) [hereinafter cited as CaliforniaHearings].
102 In reaction to Alyeska, Congress has passed several new attorneys' fees provisions;
this makes the federal forum even more attractive to litigants. See notes 64-76 and accompanying text supra.
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The Statutory Text

§ 1 Legislative Purpose
Because every citizen has an interest in the proper enforcement of the state's laws and public policies, this legislation seeks to
encourage the private enforcement of public rights by allowing the
courts to award reasonable attorneys' fees and costs in civil actions.
§ 2 Definitions
(a) "eligible party" means:
(1) a nongovernmental plaintiff in a civil action, or
(2) an intervenor in a civil action on the side of the nongovernmental plaintiff.
(b) "reasonable attorneys' fees" means an amount for services
of counsel equal to the prevailing market value of similar services rendered by one of comparable skill for a comparable
duration.
(c) Within the meaning of this statute,
(1) a party's "economic interest in the outcome of the action would normally justify the expenses of litigation" if a
reasonable person with sufficient resources to bear the expenses of litigation would find pursuing that litigation
financially justifiable.
(2) a party or group of parties does not have "sufficient
resources to bear the expenses of litigation" if that party
or group of parties is not able, or under the circumstances
cannot reasonably be considered able, to pay counsel fees
and other litigation expenses in light of his financial obligations and needs.
§ 3 Attorneys' Fees Awards
Unless substantial injustice would result thereby, the court in a
civil action shall award reasonable attorneys' fees and costs (including expert witness fees) to any eligible party whose efforts in the
litigation have produced a substantial public benefit if (1) the eligible party's economic interest in the outcome of the action would
not normally justify the expenses of litigation, or (2) the eligible
party's economic interest in the outcome of the action would normally justify the expenses of litigation, but the eligible party does
not have sufficient resources to bear the expenses of litigation and
the party represents an interest that would probably otherwise
have gone unrepresented. The court may limit the size and
number of fee awards in order to prevent substantial injustice.
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§ 4 Findings of Fact
In ruling upon an application for an award of attorneys' fees,
the court shall make written findings of fact, including a statement
of the reasons why it believes the applicant's efforts in the litigation
have or have not produced a substantial public benefit.
§ 5 Bad Faith
The court may award a defendant reasonable attorneys' fees
from any party who has brought or conducted the action in bad
faith.
§ 6 Preliminary DeterminationsRegarding Awards
At the commencement of any civil action or at any stage of the
proceedings, any party may move for a preliminary finding that
the court is likely to award reasonable attorneys' fees under this
statute. The court may make or refuse to make such a finding,
limit its finding to then existing circumstances, or find that it will
likely refuse to award reasonable attorneys' fees.
§ 7 Interim Relief
To serve the interests of justice, the court may award reasonable attorneys' fees pendente lite.
§ 8 Awards Against the State
A court may award reasonable attorneys' fees under this statute against the State, its agencies, officers, and employees.
B. Policies Behind the Statute
Our model legislation resolves nine basic policy issues that
state legislatures must consider when drafting an effective fee10 3
shifting statute.
1. Will an Attorneys' Fees Statute Encourage Nonmeritorious
Litigation?
The fear of frivolous litigation concerns critics of attorneys'
fees legislation more than any other problem . 0° 4 This is an under103 This discussion deliberately does not deal with attorneys' fees awards in agency

proceedings. Administrative and judicial proceedings differ so fundamentally that separate
legislation should govern each type of action. It makes no sense to entangle debate over
agency fee awards with discussion of a "private attorney general" statute, a concept justified by both legislative and judicial precedent.
'0' See, e.g., SOURCE BOOK, supra note 74, at 62-63 (testimony of Senator Long concern-
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standable but exaggerated concern. Critics feel that if a question
should arise about the wisdom or necessity of a proposed lawsuit,
the availability of attorneys' fees may tip the balance in favor of
proceeding with the litigation. They prefer the restraint imposed
on would-be public interest litigants by the scarcity of legal resources. This argument merely endorses continued underrepresentation of positions that go unrepresented in the governmental
decisionmaking process. It is precisely this underrepresentation
that creates the need for attorneys' fees legislation. The proposed
act would indeed expand access to the legal system, but one cannot
fault the law for producing a needed reform. Actions brought by
those formerly denied free access to the legal process will not be
more likely than other suits to involve frivolous or ill-conceived
claims.
However, to deter nonmeritorious litigation, the proposed statute includes the following safeguards. First, it allows the courts to
award the defendant attorneys' fees when they find that the plaintiff
has sued in bad faith. Second, it provides for early judicial assessment of the likelihood that either party will receive attorneys' fees.
This will deter litigious "gamblers" from abusing the availability of
fee awards; a defendant who feels threatened or harassed by nonmeritorious litigation may establish at the outset that a victory by
the plaintiff will not bring with it an attorneys' fees award. A plaintiff motivated more by the hope of obtaining fees than by the
merits of his case would probably not proceed in the face of such a
determination-especially if the determination allowed for a fee
award against the plaintiff.10 5 Finally, it limits judicial discretion in
awarding fees.' 0 6 Litigious public interest lawyers could no longer
rely on the personal inclinations of a few liberal judges.
Those who fear that fee legislation would encourage nonmeritorious litigation underestimate the difficulty of bringing a
major "private attorney general" lawsuit. As Robert Wallach, President of the San Francisco Bar Association, pointed out,
[i]t is simply inconceivable that a private attorney general
concept would encourage frivolous or nonmeritorious or spuriing Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976); CaliforniaHearings,supra note 101, at
37 (statement of William L. Berry, Jr., County Supervisors Association of California).
105 For a proposal with this safeguard, see S. 2715, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(a), 121
CONG. REc. S20,542 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 1975) (Public Participation in Government Act of
1976, sponsored by Senators Kennedy and Mathias).
106See note 111 and accompanying text infra. To help implement this safeguard, the
statute requires specific factual findings concerning the "substantial public benefit" conferred.
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ous litigation. There is just too much involved, too much undertaken, too much work, too much creative effort to simply believe
that for lack of anything better to do or as an attempt to expound the political or socio-economic philosophy the courts are
going to become an avenue of that type of litigation, and I think
that in looking at the types of cases which have been involved in
this field which have made the major mark upon our society that
they have, all of them have in common an overwhelming complexity which simply belies their nonmeritorious state. They may
may be challenging, but
be new, they may be innovative, they
1 7
0
nonmeritorious.
not
certainly
they're
Public officials commonly argue that an increase in public interest litigation would upset governmental decisionmaking processes: "[T]here are usually two sides to a question when a decision
is made and . . . the typical public agency serves not one public
interest but a number of public interests."' 0 8 This argument misses
the point. Governmental decisionmakers sometimes consider all relevant issues before resolving a social policy question, but they are
not always so omniscient. Moreover, even when they do consider
all the issues, governmental decisionmakers may make the wrong
decision, or even a decision contrary to the law. In representing
those formerly denied access to the legal process, public interest
lawyers do not seek to impinge upon the decisionmaking processes
of government; they simply seek to keep the decisionmaking process open and the decisionmaker well-informed. 10 9
2.

Should a Legislature Enact a General Attorneys' Fees Statute
or Add Attorneys' Fees Provisions to Existing Statutes?

Historically, Congress has added attorneys' fees provisions to
existing statutes." 0 The different needs and interests covered by
state legislation, however, make it inappropriate to use the federal
approach as a model for the states. Whatever the merits of selective
fee-shifting at the federal level, states should adopt a general,
uniform attorneys' fees statute incorporating the lessons learned
before Alyeska.
107 CaliforniaHearings,supra
'0

8

note 101, at 30-31.
Id. at 36 (testimony of William L. Berry, Jr., County Supervisors Association of

California).
109For a summary of the arguments on selective versus general fee-shifting legislation,
see Senate Committee on Judiciary of the California Legislature, Private Attorneys General
4-5 (1975) (Committee Paper).
110E.g., Voting Rights Act of 1965-Extension, Pub. L. No. 94-73, § 402, 89 Stat. 400
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 19731(e) (Supp. V 1975)).
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By providing standards applicable to every lawsuit, the proposed statute acknowledges the impossibility of eliminating judicial
discretion in awarding attorneys' fees. To minimize the possibility
that discretion will become capriciousness, our proposal embodies a
fee-award scheme that is uniform, circumscribed, and rational.
Any across-the-board approach, however, could inadvertently subsidize unworthy causes. Yet the risk is minimal. The proposed
statute shifts the focus of attention from the importance of the
right asserted to the value of the service the plaintiffs have performed; this eliminates much of the subjectivity that characterized
pre-Aleska cases."'
Selective fee-shifting requires legislatures to predict which
statutes will need attorneys' fees provisions to encourage private
enforcement. A general statute, on the other hand, requires less
legislative prophesy. No one can predict which rights will require
private enforcement tomorrow, next year, or ten years from
now. 1 12 As times and social conditions change, new problems and
new rights will inevitably emerge, and areas previously unlitigated
will require exploration. A general statute will encourage skilled
advocacy of such rights, and will allow courts to respond flexibly to
1
tomorrow's problems. 3
3.

What CriteriaShould Courts Use in Deciding Whether
To Award Attorneys' Fees?

Our model statute entrusts courts with the development of
these legislative goals:

"IThe importance

of the right asserted was a major factor in the pre-Alyeska period.

In Donahue v. Staunton, 471 F.2d 475 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 955 (1973), the
importance of the First Amendment rights asserted by plaintiffs particularly influenced the
court: "The benefit to the general public, i.e., of encouraging free and robust public discussion, is substantial in this case and should not depend for its protection upon the financial status of the individual who is deprived of his constitutional rights." Id. at 483. See also
Stolberg v. Board of Trustees, 474 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973); Ross v. Goshi, 351 F. Supp.
949 (D. Hawaii 1972); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd in part
sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974). However, as pre-Alyeska case law
indicates, one can never single out with certainty those rights and public policies that are
significant enough to merit encouragement by attorneys' fees awards.
12 The social "importance" of litigation does not depend on the statute under which
the suit was brought. Furthermore, astute lawyers can manipulate their clients' complaints
to capitalize on fee-award provisions. Less foresightful parties, in failing to seek relief
under a statute allowing fee awards, may be denied attorneys' fees even if they accomplish
precisely the same result.
113 Unlike selective fee-shifting provisions, a general statute with specific procedural
criteria and definitions would ensure uniformity among fee awards because it would resolve at the outset such policy questions as how to calculate the award and how to define
"substantial public benefit."
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(1) to encourage private enforcement of public policies;
(2) to permit legal representation of interests that might otherwise go unrepresented;
(3) to take account of differences in the economic circumstances of litigants as they affect access to the courts without making those differences controlling; and
(4) to avoid conferring public benefits solely at the expense
of litigants who have brought them about.
The statute tries to achieve these goals without defining the limits
of "public interest law"; rather, the statute recognizes that litigation
advances the "public interest" whenever those asserting important
rights obtain representation that they would not have obtained
through normal dealings in the legal services marketplace. The
statute's structure reflects this philosophy.
To receive fees under section 3, an eligible party must "confer
a substantial public benefit."' 1 4 An eligible party must also satisfy
one of two procedural prerequisites: (1) the party's economic interest must be such that another party in his position would normally not bring suit, or (2) if the party's economic interest would
normally justify a lawsuit, but financial circumstances prevent him
from suing, the plaintiff must represent a position that would
normally otherwise go unrepresented. This approach recognizes
that conferring a "substantial public benefit" alone should not
automatically entitle a party to receive attorneys' fees from his adversary. 1 5
Our "substantial public benefit" approach answers many of the
criticisms aimed at attorneys' fees legislation. First, it should reassure those who fear "that the Legislature could [n]ever adequately
define all of the areas in which this kind of bill might provoke a
public benefit by encouraging private attorney general litigation." ' 6 The statute does not place that impossible burden on legis114Terms such as "substantial public benefit" and "public interest" are generally so
broadly defined that they offer little help in delimiting statutory coverage. See, e.g., N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 52:27E-32 (West Supp. 1977). However, courts should have ample room to
shape the substance of these terms. By granting them discretion guided by uniform standards, the proposed statute may lead courts to more consistent and precise definitions of
"substantial public benefit." This, in turn, might help usefully define the scope of "public
interest." See note 113 supra.
'1 For example, the award should depend not only on the nature of the right itself,
but also on the economic self-interest of the party asserting it. Thus, our proposed statute
might allow attorneys' fees in favor of a group of concerned citizens that brought an action
to stop pollution of a lake, but would deny an award to a real estate speculator who stood
to gain from a development on the lake front.
116 CaliforniaHearings,supra note 101, at 91 (testimony of Malcolm A. Misuraca).
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latures. Second, this approach heeds the Supreme Court's warning
that courts should not be given a blank check to fill in whenever
they believe that the litigation before them involves an important
policy. 117 Under the statute we propose, the court's assessment of a
policy's importance would begin, not end, the inquiry.
4. Who Should Be Eligiblefor an Award of Attorneys' Fees?
Under sections 2 and 3, there are two types of eligible parties:
(1) the nongovernmental plaintiff in a civil action, and (2) the intervenor who sides with the plaintiff. The statute permits multiple
fee awards in order to encourage legitimate public interest intervenors. However, to discourage "ambulance chasing" intervenors,
and to guard against overburdening defendants with oppressive
fee assessments, the statute gives courts the discretion to "limit the
size and number of fee awards in order to prevent substantial
injustice."
An applicant for attorneys' fees need not prevail on the merits
to qualify for an award under the statute; as long as the eligible
party's actions provide a substantial public benefit, the outcome of
the litigation is not dispositive. 118 Moreover, the applicant need not
show that the suit caused in fact the dispute's settlement, mootness,
or other disposition. Requiring the applicant to show that the suit
was the direct cause of the corrective action would ask too much in
117 See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. at 263.
118

This codifies the holding of the court of appeals decision in Alyeska. See Wilderness

Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d at 1034-36. See also Vermont Low Income Advocacy Council,
Inc. v. Usery, 546 F.2d 509, 513 (2d Cir. 1976).
Sierra Club v. Lynn, 364 F. Supp. 834 (W.D. Tex. 1973), ret'd in part, 502 F.2d 43 (5th
Cir. 1974), an environmental lawsuit against HUD and San Antonio Ranch, Ltd., also involved this issue. During the course of this litigation, HUD thoroughly revised its planned
environmental safeguards, brought itself into compliance with the applicable acts, and was
permitted to proceed with the challenged housing development. The district court agreed
to consider awarding attorneys' fees, even though the plaintiffs did not prevail on the
merits: "This Court is firmly convinced that even though the plaintiffs may have, at this
stage, technically lost this lawsuit, nevertheless, a very important service has been performed in creating a greater public awareness of the dangers of pollution threatening this
very valuable natural resource ...
." Id. at 847. The court later awarded attorneys' fees
against San Antonio Ranch, emphasizing the importance of plaintiffs' actions in assuring
compliance with the law, and pointing to refinements in defendants' environmental studies
as evidence of plaintiffs' achievement. Id. at 848-49. HUD was immune from liability for
attorneys' fees. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1970).
The court of appeals, however, reversed on the question of attorneys' fees. After dismissing the applicability of both the bad-faith and common-fund exceptions (502 F.2d at
65), the court declined to follow the District of Columbia Circuit's opinion in Alyeska, refusing to assess fees "against a party innocent of any wrongdoing." Id. at 65-66. The court did
intimate, however, that it would have assessed fees against HUD were it not for its immunity. See id. at 66.
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light of predictable allegations by a defendant that his change in
course resulted from unilateral decisions rather than from the
litigation originated by the plaintiff.
Under section 5, defendants who must answer suits brought or
pursued in bad faith may also receive attorneys' fees. Some have
argued that defendants should receive fees if they can satisfy the
same test applied to plaintiffs. 1 9 But by abolishing the American
rule completely in public interest cases, this approach would deter
meritorious litigation and thereby undermine one purpose of our
proposed statute. A party that successfully defends a "private attorney general" suit stands on the same ground as a defendant in
any lawsuit; generally, such a party has neither acted from publicminded disinterest nor significantly enforced public policy. As one
witness before a committee of the California Senate testified,
"[e]ven if a private party sues to vindicate an important public
right and loses, at best the person was wrong, it doesn't necessarily
mean that the defendant by winning the case has in any way enhanced or preserved or protected important public rights or public policy.' 120 Not surprisingly, therefore, courts have generally
denied attorneys' fees awards to defendants absent bad faith on
the part of the plaintiff.'12 In our view, the policy reasons underlying this rule remain valid.
5.

Should a Court Have Discretion To Deny Fees Even Though
the Applicant Has Fully Complied with the Statute?
The statute recognizes that cases may arise where totally unpredictable circumstances make it unjust to assess fees against the
defendant. Therefore, section 3(a) provides that "[u]nless substantial injustice would result thereby, the court ... shall allow reasonable attorneys' fees." This language in effect codifies the "unless
• . . unjust" standard enunciated in Piggie Park. 2 2 Although this
provision permits judicial discretion, it imposes an important restriction by requiring a showing of "substantialinjustice." The need
to avoid unduly harsh results in special cases fully justifies this
minor concession to unpredictability.
119This issue is currently before the Supreme Court in the context of fee-shifting
under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, § 706(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970). Equal
Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Christianburg Garment Co., 550 F.2d 949, 951 (4th
Cir.), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 2948 (1977). See also Carrion v. Yeshiva Univ., 535 F.2d 722,
726-29 (2d Cir. 1976).
120 California Hearings, supra note 101, at 85 (testimony of Armando Menocal, Public
Advocates, Inc., San Francisco).
121 See United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 519 F.2d 359, 364 (3d Cir. 1975).
122 390 U.S. at 402. See notes 23-27 and accompanying text supra.
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6. How Should Courts Set the Amount of the Fee Award?
Modeled on the Freedom of Information Act Amendments of
1974,123 section 3(a) of the proposed statute allows courts to award
expert witness fees and other costs. This provision reflects the
statute's overriding intent to encourage public interest litigation.
Many public interest suits, especially those involving environmental
or employment discrimination law, cannot proceed without the use
of experts.
Section 2(b) employs a "prevailing market value" formula to
measure "reasonable attorneys' fees." The use of this formula accomplishes three goals. First, it minimizes the time that courts must
spend determining the amount of the fee award. 124 Second, because courts need not regard recent decisions as having controlling
precedential value, an unduly low award in one decision will not
123 Freedom

of Information Act Amendments of 1974, § l(b)(4)(E), 5 U.S.C. §

552(a)(4)(E) (Supp. V 1975) (allowing "reasonable attorneys fees and other litigation costs
reasonably incurred").
124 New York's quantum meruit standard illustrates how time-consuming computation of
fee awards can be. McAvoy v. Harron, 26 App. Div. 2d 452, 275 N.Y.S.2d 348 (4th Dep't
1966), aff'd mem., 21 N.Y.2d 821, 235 N.E.2d 910, 288 N.Y.S.2d 906 (1968), provides this
description:
[T]he court is itself an expert on the question and may consider its own knowledge and experience concerning reasonable and proper fees and in the light of
such knowledge and experience the court may form an independent judgment
from the facts and evidence before it as to the nature and extent of the services
rendered, make an appraisal of such services, and determine the reasonable value
thereof.
Id. at 454, 275 N.Y.S.2d at 350-5 1. Jordan v. Freeman, 40 App. Div. 2d 656, 336 N.Y.S.2d
671 (Ist Dep't 1972), lists "the nature and extent of the services, the actual time spent, the
necessity therefor, the nature of the issues involved, the professional standing of counsel,
and the results achieved" as factors a court must consider when determining the value of
legal services. Id. at 656, 336 N.Y.S.2d at 671. Similarly, when the legislature enacted the
New York Class Actions Act (N.Y. Civ. PRAC. §§ 901-909 (McKinney 1976)), it used a
"reasonable value" standard for granting attorneys' fees without providing any criteria for
its application. Id. § 909. The Practice Commentary to § 909 addresses this lack of guidance:
It should be noted that the attorney's fee will be "based on the reasonable
value of legal services rendered." The Association of the Bar of the City of New
York has recommended that the New York Courts "follow the federal practice of
basing any such award on the lawyer's time involved, the quality of his service to
the class and the extent of the benefit received by class members."
Id. § 909 note (Practice Commentaries) (quoting Special Comm. on Consumer Affairs of
the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, Committee Report: Proposed Class Action Legislation in New York, 28 REc. 481, 490 (1973)).
Unlike quantum meruit and similar standards, a market-value formula does not require
the court to make a valuation analysis. Instead, the court may simply call on experts to
inform it of going rates for legal services. Although some of the factors cited in McAvoyV
and Jordan will still determine the amount of the award, valuation will take place in the
market, rather than in the courtroom.
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necessarily discourage future public interest litigation. Third, a
market-value rule encourages involvement of the private bar, particularly the general practice bar, because it grants fees competitive
with those earned in ordinary private litigation. 1 25
7.

Should Courts Have the Power To Grant Attorneys' Fees
Before FinalJudgment?

Section 6 of our statute answers this question affirmatively.
Most of the litigation affected by this statute involves vast amounts
of time and expense. Therefore, absent a mechanism to provide
interim grants of partial fees and costs, the litigation might be
forced to a halt. 1 2 6 However, a court should award attorneys' fees
on an interim basis only upon a clear showing that the plaintiff or
intervenor cannot otherwise continue the litigation, and will likely
qualify for fees after final judgment.
8.

Should Courts Have the Power To Assess Reasonable
Attorney's' Fees Against the State?
Although the state will not frequently be the defendant in
public interest suits, a fee award is particularly appropriate when
it is. The state is not only able to marshal great resources against
litigants who challenge it, but can spread the costs of public interest
litigation better than any other defendant. 2 7 More importantly,
when the state itself violates the law, its citizens need most the
128
vigorous efforts of a "private attorney general.'
9. Should Courts Have the Power To Award Reasonable
Attorneys' Fees in Favor of the State?
Fee-shifting makes it possible for private parties to enter the
courtroom whenever the state cannot or will not represent a particular viewpoint on a public policy issue. The state already has full
125Involvement of the private bar is particularly important to the well-being of public
interest litigation. See note 101 and accompanying text supra.
26
' See H.R. REP. No. 94-1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 ("Such awards pendente lite are
particularly important in protracted litigation, where it is difficult to predicate with any
certainty the date upon which a final order will be entered.").
127 In this sense, a recovery against the state is similar to the recovery in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 735 (1970). The corporation in Mills could spread the costs
among its shareholders, in the same manner that a state can spread the costs among its
citizens. For a discussion of Mills, see notes 28-34, 82-83, and accompanying text supra.
128By providing a specific statutory waiver, section 7 of our proposed statute precludes the state's use of sovereign immunity as a shield against fee awards. Cf. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412 (1970) (federal government immune from assessment of attorneys' fees absent
specific statutory authorization).
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access to public funds, and therefore does not need fee awards as
an encouragement to defend its own policies. Moreover, the fear of
being required to pay the state's attorney might discourage private
parties from bringing into question state actions that will otherwise
go unchallenged. For these reasons, we reject entirely fee awards to
the state.
CONCLUSION

The Aleska decision, although perhaps analytically sound,
produced an undesirable result: it discouraged public interest litigation. Well-drawn legislation built on the "private attorney general" concept would virtually eliminate this problem. Indeed, as the
history of the concept shows, the "private attorney general" theory
opens courtroom doors to full representation of important public
interests. States should promptly authorize attorneys' fees awards
to deserving private litigants who confer significant public benefits
by seeking judicial enforcement of important policies. If enacted,
broad-based fee-shifting legislation would wisely expand public
participation in the governmental processes that daily touch our
lives.

